IN HONOUR OF ANGUS MADDISON
The most important questions in economics are about why economies grow as fast or slowly as they do, and why some economies grow faster than others. Small differences in economic performance sustained over long periods generate huge differences in the distribution of economic welfare and in economic and, eventually, political power.
These overwhelmingly important questions affecting human economic life. are neglected by the deductive methods which dominate modern economics. The deduction of logical conclusions from narrowly specified assumptions provides few insights into the ultimate sources-the institutions and values--of differences in economic growth between countries and over time. These insights come especially from the careful study of economic history. The importance of particular institutions comes to be understood through the association of differences in economic performance with changes & differences in institutional structures. These associations are identified from careful numerical study of economic performance. The starting point is the careful marshalling of data.
In Maddison's words:
"Without measurement, judgements on why some countries got rich, why others are poor, why some catch up and others fall behind, are bound to be fuzzy. Quantification sharpens scholarly discussion and contributes to the dynamics of the research process." (Reference: To Angus Maddison, and the large numbers of good scholars in many countries who toiled with him in this demanding but in the end productive soil, we are grateful for much careful measurement of economic performance over long periods. This has been the starting point for his own and others' economic histories that have drawn insights about the wellsprings of superior and inferior performance in economic development.
We at the ANU have benefited greatly from the regular visits of Angus over many years. This enjoyable personal contact increased our awareness of the vast scope of Angus' curiosity and work & expanded the knowledge that we have found in his prodigious published output. relative roles in the global economy. We understand better the extent of the increases over a relatively short period in economic output and living standards in the economies in which growth accelerated at these times. We know from this work that differentials in economic performance, once established, tend to persist over long periods, with huge cumulative effects .We also know that they can abruptly conclude with war, revolution and less dramatic sources of disorder.
Many of the insights in Maddison's work are brought together in his compelling Millennial Report. This begins with an astounding contrast between two sets of facts. In the first millenium after the life of Jesus Christ, the world's economic output increased hardly at all-by one sixth, all contributed by population growth and none from rising per capita output. By contrast, global output increased 300-fold in the second millennium, which concluded half a dozen years ago. Over these one thousand years, world population increased 22 times, and average output 13-fold. The expansion in the second millennium occurred overwhelmingly late in the period. In the eight centuries to 1820, "the advance in per capita income was a slow crawl-the 3 world average rose about 50 percent. Most of the growth went to accommodate a fourfold increase in population". By contrast, world development has been much more dynamic since1820. Between then and the end of the millennium, per capita income rose more than eight times, and population more than fivefold. (Reference: Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: a Millennial Report, OECD Development Centre, Paris, 2001, p17) .
THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH TO THE GOLDEN AGE
Maddison divides the time of rapid modern economic growth, from the settling down of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars until the present, into five periods.
Of these, 1950-1973 was distinctly the strongest for increases in economic activity and living standards. Maddison and others call this the Golden Age.
Second best, which we can call the Silver Age, was from 1973 until the end of last century--a period which people who had lived through the Golden Age thought was problematic. In fact, the late twentieth century was an extraordinary period by historical standards. It saw overall economic growth that was strong by any comparison other than that with the Golden Age. It was more extraordinary because sustained rapid economic growth spread powerfully from its original locus in the North Atlantic economies, their outliers and Japan, to a large part of Asia.
The third strongest period for rapid economic growth was the long boom from 1870-1913-roughly In this paper, I seek to look forward by standing on Maddison's shoulders. I draw on some of his insights to sketch the possible shape of the world economy as contemporary tendencies work themselves into history-perhaps turning out to be rather more powerful than Maddison has suggested in his 4 published work. I then raise some issues about the nature of the international governance mechanisms that will be necessary to maintain peace and prosperity in the world of the future, in which, at least for a while, four large political entities dominate the global economy.
My starting points are some extrapolations in a paper recently presented by Back in 1500, two large Asian economies, India and China-or, rather, two large regions that covered territory later and from time to time largely and today entirely governed as India and China--were of roughly similar economic size, and together represented a bit more than half of global economic output.
There had been considerable growth in total economic output in India between 1300 & 1500 during a long period of relative political stability, catching up with a China that was stagnating from the disruption of war, dynastic change & civil disturbance.
After 1500, the dominant trends in the global economy were the restoration of China's earlier relative position over the first one and a half centuries or so of the Qing dynasty, and the acceleration of economic growth in Western
Europe-the latter much more powerfully after the Napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century. In 1820, which in Maddison's table is the beginning of the modern era of rapid economic growth in the North Atlantic, China accounted for almost a third of global economic output. Europe was responsible for something in excess of a quarter. India, through a period of external invasion and disorder, grew reasonably strongly by the standards of earlier times, doubling its size between 1500-1820, but nevertheless fell well back behind both China & Western Europe. Note: Estimates of GDP levels are adjusted to reflect purchasing power parities in the benchmark year 1990 (see Maddison 1998:149-66) . In China the purchasing power of the yuan is much higher than the exchange rate. There is often significant error in comparative economic analysis because ignorance of the pitfalls of exchange rate conversion leads to serious understatement of the level of Chinese GDP. This is true in journalism, political discourse and amongst some economists. Thus newspapers frequently refer to Japan as the world's second largest economy, though its GDP is less than half of the Chinese. It should also be noted that official Chinese statistics exaggerate GDP growth for reasons explained in Maddison (1998) , which contains a detailed re-estimation of performance up to 1995 . For 1995 -2003 made the same type of downward adjustment to the official estimate of growth in real value added in industry and 'non-productive' services (see Maddison 2006) Source: Maddison, 2006 6 From about 1820, everything changed. Table 5 .
Maddison, Snooks, Jones and, drawing on comparative insights from his intimate knowledge of the long-run economic history of China, Elvin, amongst scholars with whom we at the ANU have had the privilege of interacting on campus, have all contributed to our understanding of the European miracle.
That phenomenon began its ascent in the middle of the last millennium and accelerated during the nineteenth century. Myriad geographical & institutional characteristics that generated effective competition between states for productive people and means of conducting business. Successful political systems expanded, without being so successful-like the Chinese or Moghuls-that they entrenched powerful political entities over such large areas that they were able to stamp out economic and intellectual innovation when they threatened the established political and economic orders.
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The acceleration of economic growth spread rapidly from its original heartland The aggregate economic story in India in the early period of intense contact with imperialism was stronger, with output doubling between 1820 and 1913.
India had neither the extreme of instability during the period of colonial pressure, nor quite the degree of order of China at the beginning of the period.
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The first half of the twentieth century in India was unhappy for economic
growth.
In what is now the third most populous developing country, Indonesia, there was considerable economic growth between 1820 and 1913, but with a high proportion of it appropriated by the large numbers of resident Dutch. (Maddison, Arndt Lecture) Looking at the Maddison numbers, there was a break in the trajectory of global economic growth and its regional distribution with World War Two. In many respects, the break was as decisive as that at the onset of modern economic growth. The Golden Age was a period of exceptionally strong economic growth in the countries that had already become relatively rich, including those whose past economic achievements had been degraded during World War Two. Growth was most rapid in those countries that were able quickly to recover lost ground. Japan was producing at the level of the Although India's growth was superior to that in any previous extended period, it suffered by comparison with the market economies of East Asia, and to a lesser extent China, and was routinely denigrated inside and outside the country as an inadequate "Hindu rate of growth".
The historically distinctive change in the Golden Age was the appearance of the new phenomena of sustained rapid economic growth in many parts of East Asia. It emerged first in Japan. Japan grew so rapidly in the sixties that its audacious plan to double output in a decade was achieved a couple of years ahead of schedule. More remarkably, the process of sustained rapid internationally-oriented growth was established in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Those initially poor economies' comparative advantage lay in commodities that used intensively abundant labour. Outward-looking policies allowed this to become the basis for rapid export expansion, as management capacity and capital became available from mainland China after the success of the revolution. Korea's internationally oriented policies and development framework from the early 1960s were built around an objective of rapid growth. Rapid growth continued in each Northeast Asian economy once it was established, until it reached the frontiers of the developed countries in average productivity and incomes, first of all in Japan.
Singapore launched itself on a rapid growth path following the separation from Malaysia in the mid 1960's, and grew more rapidly even than the Northeast Asian developing market economies.
During the Golden Age, growth in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and in the second half of the period, Singapore and Korea, was stronger for longer than anything that had been previously known in the history of humanity.
Sustained economic growth in these economies was essentially catching up with the capital intensity and productivity of the world's advanced economies, within societies that had accepted the primacy of an economic growth objective. The starting point in all cases was the overthrow of priorities and cultural inhibitions associated with old ways of life whenever they were widely recognised as being in clear conflict with the imperatives of economic growth.
The challenge from the economically and technologically powerful West in the 19 th and early 20 th centuries had in many cases generated an initially negative reaction which lasted for varying periods. The ultimate reaction-so far everywhere except North Korea, but that is changing--was one of realisation that maintenance of national sovereignty in any sense demanded economic modernisation, involving opening up to the international economy and absorbing the technological and many aspects of the institutional framework of economies that were already successful.. For the smaller countries of East Asia, strategic vulnerability in relation to neighbours was a powerful additional impetus to change in economic strategy.
Sustained rapid economic growth in East Asia was associated with high levels European homes. India's economic and political experience had not been so disastrous as to shake confidence in the old approaches in a decisive way. In this distorted sense, India was at a disadvantage relative to China, where the Cultural Revolution had been an important spur to fundamental change.
Internationally aware Indians, resident abroad and at home, became increasingly concerned at the relative under-performance of their economy as one after another of the East Asian economies did much better. Bhagwati has described one of the origins of Indian reform in 1991 as the disagreeable position of having a superiority complex and an inferior status. In the end, the poor performance relative to China was such a challenge to Indian pride, and also potentially a challenge to Indian sovereignty, that its influence was decisive.
The Indian changes came more gradually than the Chinese, as they must in a There is no necessary or likely economic reason why growth rates will ease at all until average Chinese labour productivity is much closer to the average of the developed economies than it will be through the period to 2020. I will come back to the reasons.
Considerable and accelerating momentum has been achieved in Indian economic growth since 1991. Growth momentum is accelerating, not decelerating, so it would take a major disturbance to push average growth rates 2003-30 back to the levels of the Silver Age. Growth is becoming more securely based politically and economically. A demographic structure that is mors favourable than China's for sustaining growth, and the large gap between Chinese and Indian productivity levels that emerged in the thirteen years between the commenced in the two countries, and which has widened since, suggest that rapid growth in India will be maintained after China approaches the frontiers of global productivity and slows down. Again excepting fundamental domestic or external political dislocation, India's share of global output will rise strongly most strongly after China slows , perhaps from the early 2020s.
Sustained rapid growth in China and India will keep terms of trade historically high for commodity exporting countries, and create opportunities for others in global markets for labour-intensive manufactures as Chinese labour rapidly becomes more scarce and valuable. It seems unlikely that the economies outside the big four and Japan-the rest of the world in Table 1 In the early 1990s, with Guonan Ma (Garnaut and Ma, 1993) , and later Yiping
Huang (Garnaut and Huang, 1994) , I sought indirectly to estimate the level of Chinese GDP by reference to per capita consumption of a wide range of foodstuffs and inputs into industrial activity. Ma, Huang and I compared then contemporary Chinese per capita consumption, with that of other East Asian economies, at various times past. Taiwan was our prime comparator. Our conclusion then was that the measures of GDP per capita derived from taking standard national accounts data and converting them to dollars at prevailing exchange rates, underestimated China's GDP relative to other developing economies at times when their announced GDP was similar to China's in the early 1990s, by a factor of about 3. The common underestimation for 21 countries at China's level of development and incomes, relative to the advanced economies, was commonly in the vicinity of three. So conventional measures of GDP tended in the early 1990s to underestimate Chinese GDP relative to developed countries by a factor of 9, and PPP estimates by three.
Gradually, in the years since then, we have seen the removal of some of that part of this underestimation that was particular to China, beyond the general tendency for the national accounts data to understate the purchasing power of 
I am broadly comfortable with the Maddison and Wu historical estimates, both
on levels and on rates of growth of Chinese GDP. I would make two points about the future. First, the sources of modest overestimation of Chinese growth rates in the reform era are less important now than in the late 1990s.
Indeed, similarly careful assessment of recent Chinese growth data suggests no grounds for downward adjustment to the strong numbers in the vicinity of 9 and 10%. Second, there is considerable doubt about whether we should expect a deceleration in Chinese growth over the next decade or even over the next several decades. Chinese investment levels are now much higher than the average in the reform period when growth has been so high. There is no economic reason why these levels of investment need to fall. Investment shares of GDP in the vicinity of 40-45% are quite sustainable in an economy which is tending to save one half of total incomes (Garnaut and Huang, 2005) .
Indeed there is room for domestic demand expansion and somewhat higher rates of growth without risking either domestic inflation or external instability so long as other aspects of macroeconomic policy are adjusted accordingly.
The crucial adjustment is the faster appreciation of the real exchange rate which in a country with a recent low inflation, will have to be achieved through nominal appreciation of the renminbi.
China will reach a turning point in economic development in the years immediately ahead. Previously apparently unlimited supplies of labour will dry up, labour scarcity become the norm and real wages begin to rise rapidly (see Garnaut and Song, 2006 , especially Chapters One and Two). This process has already begun in coastal China. There are several reasons why the turning point in economic development has come relatively early in the development process in China, and why the Chinese economy will move through the structural change associated with the turning point relatively quickly. One is the exceptionally rapid rate of growth in total output & demand for labour. The second is the sharp decline in fertility which occurred about the time of the reform policies, which has led to sharply lower rates of total population and now labour force growth. This has been going on for long enough for the number of new entrants into the labour force each year to be declining absolutely. The third reason for expecting a sharp adjustment in the labour market is that total levels of investment in education have been rising strongly, from reasonably high levels by developing countries standards despite the tragic gap of the Cultural Revolution years. This rising total amount of investment has been focussed on smaller & smaller numbers of Chinese students in the school ages, so that the level of education being made available to each young Chinese is rising sharply. That adds to the market squeeze on unskilled labour in the period ahead and is contributing to rapid increases in real wage rates. This will accelerate China's loss of competitiveness in simple labour intensive manufactures and force transition into technologically more sophisticated & more capital intensive export industries.
As a result, appreciation of the real exchange rate will be achieved through nominal appreciation or domestic inflation. China through these processes will gradually remove the gap between GDP as measured by purchasing power methods and estimated by converting national accounts data into international dollars at prevailing exchange rates-but purchasing power-based estimates of GDP, as applied by Maddison, will not be affected.
There is no necessary reason why this major transition in China will be associated with any slowing of economic growth. Of course, certain conditions must be met if rapid growth is to continue through and beyond the turning point. The most important of these is a high degree of flexibility in domestic resource allocation. This requires acceptance of far-reaching change in the structure of industry as labour-intensive industries decline & technologically more sophisticated industries take their place. China is in a good position to accept changes of this kind. On the whole, they will be supportive of political stability around rapid growth processes because of the rapid increases in real wages in urban & rural areas with which they will be associated.
Beyond the increased rate of capital intensification of production in China, the second reason for expecting the continuation of high growth is the continuing deepening of integration into the international economy. Chinese import shares of consumption & export shares of production continue to rise at extraordinary rates. China is already the world's third largest export market and, within a few years, will soon occupy a similar status in global import markets. In a few years, it will be the world's largest trading economy. China is by far the largest recipient of direct foreign investment amongst developing countries. These huge direct foreign investment flows with their associated contributions to technological improvement can be expected to continue.
These factors & continued reform of the market economy can be expected to lead to high rates of productivity growth for some time, until China is much closer to average productivity levels of the developed countries.
The Chinese authorities have been announcing an objective of reducing the rate of growth now for most of the years of the twenty first century. They have and, probably some increase in them, will be a necessary part of the overall adjustment through which China must go in its macroeconomic structure.
The story of Indian growth is currently less familiar to economists in the West.
After a long period of growth fluctuating around 4%, the "Hindu rate of growth", the reforms of the late 80s and, especially 1991, led to significant & sustained lift in average growth rates. Over recent years, we have seen 7-8% growth rates, in the range that was once familiar only as sustained growth rates in East Asian countries. The economically reputed Prime Minister has announced a medium term objective closer to 10%.
One remarkable feature of recent Indian growth has been that, as in East Asia, the savings rate has risen endogenously with rapid growth in incomes.
Having languished in the high teens in earlier years, the Indian savings rate rose to 23% a few years ago, and is 30% in the latest data. This was the rate in Japan at the beginning of the 60s. Continued high incomes growth saw the savings rate in Japan rise beyond 30% through the 60s just as continued strong growth over a long period of time led to continued increases in the Korean and Chinese savings rates. Continued incomes growth will see yet higher proportions of income allocated to savings & this will support higher levels of investment in both the private and public sectors without risking macroeconomic instability. This is going to be an important fly wheel for higher growth into the foreseeable future.
The second likely source of an acceleration of Indian economic growth is the recent & short history of reform which means that many of the productivity raising structural changes with which they were associated are still coming through. In a democratic polity, every reform step is contested, but the outcomes have been favourable enough to increase political commitment to going further. The continuation of the current trajectory of reform will lead to continued increases in productivity growth for some time. India is subject to a different range of uncertainties. My own judgement is that the purely domestic political risks to Indian growth are now very much less than at the beginning of the reform era and, in fact, small. That judgement depends on a view that the current Congress Party Government will find and implement mechanisms to directly improve the incomes of Indians in rural areas, a large proportion of whom so far have received little benefit from the acceleration of growth and who are influential in the democratic process.
Considerable thought and priority is being given to these matters in India today.
The world that is created by the extension of sustained, rapid economic growth to the populous countries of Asia is vastly different in the distribution of power across the international community, and in its demands on international public goods to maintain political stability and prosperity. The Golden Age occurred in a bipolar international order, with the US exercising hegemonic influence and being prepared to accept high leadership costs in maintaining favourable international conditions for economic growth in its (majority) part of the world system. This structure gave way late in the Silver Age to a uni-polar world, in which the idea took root in influential parts of the US that international public goods could be supplied by the exercise of power by one dominant country. Hopes that US hegemonic leadership could maintain a stable international economic and political order have been undermined by the demonstration of the limits of US power in Iraq in particular, at a time when there is growing awareness of the need for cooperation to internalise within policy-making states the external security, environmental, economic and developmental costs of their decisions.
The greatest risks to the world experiencing a Platinum Age are around the challenge to build a suitable institutional framework to accommodate the emerging reality of the world economy being dominated by four great entities, of which the US is no longer the largest. Maddison's work tells us that rebuilding the international framework is a matter of great urgency. The implication of the huge changes is that a failure of timely institutional development could be destructive of both peace and prosperity. My own additional thoughts do not change this outlook; they just reduce the time in which changes must be made, and increase the costs of failure.
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS IN THE PLATINUM AGE
Maddison's 2030 world will be much more deeply integrated in many ways than it is today. The international trade share of output & expenditure will have continued to rise mainly because of continued technological improvement, which is reducing the costs of international transport & communications.
Hopefully, there will also be contributions from the liberalisation of trade in many countries, with India having more potential for change than the other major economies.
There will be immense challenges to stability in relations among states in at least five areas. New mechanisms will need to be developed for the delivery of international public goods for the maintenance of security in a conventional sense, for promoting development in poor countries and regions so as to reduce the external costs of poverty and State failure, for the avoidance of global environmental failure on a scale that threatens global prosperity, for the redistribution of global savings amongst economies, and for maintenance of an open international trading system.
First, in the security sphere, technological advance, the spread of knowledge across humanity, and rising incomes will have greatly expanded the range, power and availability of weapons of mass destruction.
Second, falling international transport and communications costs and rising incomes will at once have increased concern for international poverty in a prosperous world (because of increased awareness of external poverty and because compassion backed by financial assistance is a superior good), and increased the costs and risks of failures of order and development in parts of the world (through transmission of public health, crime and environmental problems amongst other things).
Third, there will be an increase in the importance of and awareness about the external environmental costs of economic growth that is not modified to take environmental considerations into account.
Fourth, it is likely that, in the absence of fundamental change in consumer behaviour (which is likely to occur only over long periods of time), world savings, and over time probably world wealth, will be concentrated much more than world production and income in the rapidly growing Asian economies. This will pose a challenge to international financial intermediation and to political attitudes to foreign investment in the countries that became rich before others.
Finally, in future, as now and in the past, there will be domestic political The postwar security system built around the Security Council and the veto of great powers is, ironically, more suitable to the quadrilateral world that is emerging than to either the bipolar or unipolar worlds of the past half century.
None of the great powers will be able to achieve its security interests alone.
Collective action by the four overwhelming powers will be able to achieve a great deal. Union will give it a special place for some time, justifying a continuing role in the Security Council.
The NPT is well designed to manage the risk of nuclear proliferation if it has the unambiguous support of the great powers. The problem is that the genie has already escaped, with a number of minor and second rung powers having nuclear weapons and one or more being on the verge of joining them. There was some inevitably in India joining the nuclear club given its emerging status, but the manner of its joining damaged the international control framework.
It will be tempting for the US polity to pretend that nothing has changed; that it can continue to pursue the Neo-conservative dream of permanent military superiority. Any attempt to do so would accelerate the relative economic decline of the US. The US needs early adjustment to a quadrilateral international security framework, while it still has the economic and military capacity disproportionately to shape events. Every action of the US leadership over recent years has been in an opposite direction. It will not be easy for the US political community to adjust to the rapidly changing power realities. A failure to do so would be damaging to global including US security.
Technological improvement, rising incomes and the spread of knowledge have greatly reduced entry barriers to the nuclear club. Strong and early support by all of the emerging great powers for reform and enforcement of the NPT would seem to be a condition for avoidance of nuclear catastrophe before the Platinum Age has delivered on its promise.
(ii) International Development
International externalities from failures of development and government, and awareness of their importance, have been increasing in recent times.
Terrorism, health and the environment have joined traditional economic and social reasons for concern.
The extent to which cooperation across the whole international community is necessary for the correction of these externalities requires analysis. Most development assistance is provided on a bilateral basis, and governed by The principle of subsidiarity is as relevant in this sphere as in many others.
Much development assistance can be delivered most effectively by donors who have special knowledge and interest in a recipient country, and this work is best left to them. But multilateral action can be helpful to the debate and transmission of ideas about development, to provide assistance to those which miss out in the geostrategic interest race, and to establish rules to constrain the use of aid for non-development purposes that can generate problems for political stability and the trading system. On the whole, the structure of existing institutions provides a good starting point for this workalthough the quality of the work of established institutions leaves much to be desired. The necessary adjustment to the emerging global power realities involves improvement of performance, and induction of the emerging powers into leadership and over time financial support for the multilateral effort, rather than radical institutional change.
(iii) International Environmental Externalities
Industrial growth in one country, especially a large economy, imposes external environmental costs on its cross-border and regional neighbours.
Within the principle of subsidiarity, these are best managed through bilateral and regional mechanisms. The main external environmental costs of economic growth on a global scale relate to global warming.
It is now widely accepted that the avoidance of risks of hugely damaging costs from global warming will require an international regime for discouraging the emission and encouraging sequestration of greenhouse
gases. An international regime in which limited rights to emit greenhouse gases are traded globally is now widely understood to be part of the eventual necessary response to the problem. The Kyoto Treaty under UN auspices has expanded practical knowledge in member countriesdeveloping and developed-of the operation of a carbon trading system.
The associated expansion of knowledge will allow improvements, as the regime is extended to controls on emissions (and not just participation in trading) in developing countries.
There are two major barriers to the adoption of the necessary carbon trading system. One is acceptance of participation by all major economies.
One of the two non-participants among developed countries, Australia, has recently accepted at Government level that it will need to do so, albeit on conditions that will take considerable time to fulfil. Unfortunately, the remaining outsider is particularly important-but there are signs that the turning of the political wheel will open the way for US participation.
The second barrier is the inherent difficulty of reaching agreement on a system for allocating initial emissions rights within a global trading system. signs that the system is in decline.
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The decline has its origin in a paradox at the heart of the trading system.
There is a sense that there are no external costs to domestic trade policy decisions that one State might take in its own national interest. A country damages itself as much or more than others from restricting imports. A country pursuing its own national interest would do the same, thus enhancing the value of the first country's decision to pursue free trade.
The political reality is sometimes different. The simple listing and commencement of analysis of the international institutional arrangements that are necessary in the emerging quadrilateral raises serious questions about the international community's capacity to deliver a satisfactory response. In recent years, the world has mostly been heading in the wrong direction (security, the international trading system) or making negligible progress (development assistance and the environment regime). If there is no early change in trajectory on international institutional arrangements, the probability is uncomfortably high that the prospects for a Platinum Age will recede under mushroom or dust clouds, or in a Mad Max world of broken order in unsuccessful developing countries.
Under the clouds or in the Mad Max world, the Maddison projections on global economic output would be optimistic. Some economies would do better than others, and the rapidly expanding new economic powers with the flexibility provided by their stage of development would probably be damaged less than either established developed or poor developing countries. But none would do well. Maddison's work encourages us to think through the big issues before it is too late.
